Wed 7 Nov 2007
iata si studiul pe rusia. iata comunicatul de presa, dar merita citit cel putin executive summary de la inceputul raportului. dar sigur studiul contine multa info si nuante care nu se gasesc in executive summary.
iata cateva reactii si relatari in media: guardian, eu observer, the economist blog, washington post/reuters, kommersant si cateva in rusa (unele suparate altele mai putin): moskovskie novosti, rb.ru, vzglyad, O2 TV, si RBC daily.
si cateva bloguri: Dumitru Manzarari (in rusa), Robert Amsterdam (fostul avocat al lui khodorkovsky) cu o reactie desfasurata, eurotrib (foarte critic) si tapmag.
November 8th, 2007 at 7:52 am
RBC mai au putin si o sa va demonizeze. Astept reactii de la alti paranoici din presa rusa, e distractiv.:)
November 11th, 2007 at 4:39 am
“A Power Audit” este una dintre cele mai bune analize scrise in ultima vreme pe politica fata de Rusia. Felicitari si sper sa continuati sa aprofundati aceste idei si, mai ales, sa fiti luati in seama de catre liderii europeni. Studiul a primit media exposure neasteptat de buna, semn ca a fost publicat la momentul potrivit. Totusi, The Economist (care este, in mod normal, destul de fair) va acuza in mod nemeritat ca “analysis and prescription are chasing each other in a circle: the EU suffers from a lack of unity, it would do better if it could unite”. Cred ca ati oferit destule solutii clare in studiu, iar “The Economist” ar face bine sa-si dea si ei cu parerea despre ce ar trebui facut, in loc sa critice fara sa puna nimic in loc.
Lucian
November 11th, 2007 at 6:59 pm
Nicu, desi e mult dupa miezul noptii, dar de ora va citesc studiul si nu ma pot rupe. Felicitari.
Astept sa stam de vorba despre tehnologia scrierii si ce a ramas la footnotes.
Pe cand o prezentare la Chisinau?
November 12th, 2007 at 12:55 pm
merci mult pentru reactii! apreciez foarte mult.
revin cu mai multe raspunsuri (si un post despre cum s-a scris raportul) in cateva zile.
November 12th, 2007 at 1:29 pm
Am asteptat mult aparitia acestui studiu… dar a meritat asteptarea. FELICITARI Nicu!
Sper ca paradigma \”rule of law\” promovata de acest studiu sa aiba cel putin acelasi efect (crucial) asupra Europei pe care a avut-o \”long telegram\” a lui George Kennan asupra SUA acum 6 decenii…cu toate ca ma cam indoiesc…
November 13th, 2007 at 9:50 am
Astazi Oleg Serebrian a spus ca UE nu are mare importanta pentru RM in “ruperea” noastra de FR. Si ca ar trebui sa mizam pe SUA, care “nu ne-a cedat Rusiei” si care “are toate posibilitatile sa ne ajute pentru a ne scoate din sfera de influente ale Rusiei”.
November 13th, 2007 at 4:36 pm
Oleg, discutiile geopolitice despre alinieri sunt teorii.
UE are importanta practica. ruperea de Rusia inseamna: standarde de transparenta in sectorul energetic, lupta cu coruptia, sistem judecatoresc functional care eventual ar aduce si investitii europene mai mari, comert mai mult cu UE, mai multe schimburi de studenti. toate ar servi ruperii de Rusia, si toate sunt descrise in Planul de actiuni UE-Moldova. si toate sunt niste oferte din partea UE pentru Moldova nu a SUA.
solutia insa pentru ruperea de marasmul post-sovietic nu va veni nici din SUA nici din UE, ci din implementarea riguroasa de catre moldova a planului de actiuni, de exemplu. aceasta rupere va veni si prin schimbarea mentalitatilor – schimburi de studenti, burse de cercetare – or iarasi UE, nu SUA este factorul care conteaza in acest sens. la fel si investitii – SUA practic nu investeste in regiune. dar pentru toate acestea e nevoie de crearea conditiilor locale.
November 14th, 2007 at 7:33 am
Nicu, de acord cu tine. Geopolitica in discursul lui Serbrian e kibitzism in directia unor personalitati ca Brzezinski sau Kissinger, sau alte fosile interbelice din geopolitca germana. Nu ca nu-i apreciez pe cei din urma, doar ca ei o pot (au putut-o) face cu adevarat, iar Serebrian nu poate decat sa contempleze ce se intampla in jurul lui. Mai mult, cred ca atunci cand emeritul poltician Serebrian face apel la un discurs geopolitic el nu-si da seama (sau poate da) ca lumea avizata din Occident, dar nu numai, nu-l mai ia in seama. Pentru europeni ‘geopolitica’ e aproape un cuvant obsolet. Ar fi bine ca dl. S. sa mai ‘sheteasca’ si niste manuale de integrare europeana si in general surse de genul asta (plus politici publice), nu numai haushoferi, mackinderi sau dughini. Astea intuneca mintea !
De rusia nu te poti ‘rupe’ brusc. O poti face incremental, incepand cu cele enumerate de Nicu, care sant doar pentru introducere. Nu stiu sigur ce-i in capul d-lui S, dar americanii sant prea preocupati de Orientul Mijlociu+Iran+nonproliferare+Coreea de Nord+Kosovo, si au mai si intrat deja in campania prezidentiala. Aceasta inseamna ca pana in primavara lui 2009 americanii nu prea se vor mai uita in directia noastra, decat daca va avea loc vre-un nou ‘show’ ca cel din 2003 (si asta putin probabil). Doar nu-si inchipuie dl. S ca la summitul NATO de la Becuresti Republicii Moldova i se va acorda un statut asemanator cu al Georgiei !
Poate gresesc, dar se pare ca dl.S, cu un astfel de dicurs se indreapta tot mai mult spre cateogria politicienilor demni de a fi casati, “spisuiti”.
November 14th, 2007 at 1:41 pm
[...] multe dintre acestea sunt deja pe blog. [...]
November 15th, 2007 at 1:05 am
Intr-adevar, discursul geopolitic a lui Serebrian lasa mult de dorit. Dar sa nu uitam ca inainte de a fi “politician emerit”, Serebrian a fost un ginditor geopolitic (poate ca nu e tocmai expresia potrivita)…
O fi probabil geopolitica “un cuvint obsolet” pentru europeni dar nu-mi prea vine a crede ca europenii nu mai gindesc geopolitic. Si nici nu cred ca ar trebui. Acesta este, daca nu gresesc, si mesajul lui Nicu si Mark in noul lor studiu: Europa trebuie sa fie unita pentru a putea face fata Rusiei. Ipoteza lui Nicu referitor la ne-importanta geopoliticii tine concret de Moldova si la europenizarea sa: europenizarea Moldovei nu se face nici prin alinierea sa la Rusia, nici la UE. Pentru a deveni europeana, Moldova trebuie sa se mobilizeze si sa se concentreze pe dimensiunea interna, adica sa implementeze reforme. Nu-i asa?
November 15th, 2007 at 10:21 am
Totusi, intr-un fel as fi inclinat sa cred ca discutiile despre geopolitica, calificate, nu sunt de ignorat. totul este mai intii o teorie, nu-i asa Nicule? Chiar si studiul cu pricina, mai intii a aparut ca o idee teoretica, pe care ulterior ati dezvoltat-o intr-un produs intelectual, care are posibilitatea sa devina un policy paper.
Mai mult ca atit, este la fel opinia mea ca Serebrean are dreptate in sensul ca SUA ar fi capabila sa ofere mai multa asistenta politica reala, in comparatie cu UE, atit considerind alienarea mai puternica a SUA cu Rusia, cit si dependenta mai mare a UE fata de Rusia, apoi si ineficienta institutionala a Uniunii o face un partener destul de incet, pe care trebuie sa-l astepti cu anii sa-si dezvolte inertia intr-o directie oarecare. Sunt mai multe argumente de ce SUA ar fi in perioada istorica, real, un partener mai eficient, decit UE.
Aditional, totul ce ai enumerat sa contribue la diminuarea vulnerabilitatilor fata de presiunile Rusiei gasesc intelegerea mea. Dar exista tendinta aceasta de a se axa doar pe procesele si transformarile externe, ca conditii pentru transformarea democratica intr-un stat. Insa nu te-ai gidit ca factorii externi nu sunt mai putin importanti, in special pentru statele mici, cu o populatie usor de manipulat, din motivul ignorantei sale? Doar in timpul razboiului rece in multe state din lumea treia la putere veneau regimuri totalitare cu sprijinul din exterior, si nu putea fi date jos, decit la fel o data cu disparitia spirjinului din exterior, sau cind opizitia primea o sustinere mai mare de la o alta mare putere. Proxy-wars conceptul nu cred ca este complet irelevant in cazul Moldovei, sau in spatiul post-sovietic. De fapt anume pe influenta factorilor externi asupra dinamicii si dezvoltarii democratice in statele post-sovietice imi concentrez la moment eforturile in cadrul programului de cercetare la care particip.
November 23rd, 2007 at 8:30 am
primesc multe comentarii – unele substantiale, altele mai putin la raportul pe rusia. iata unul de un presupus expert pe regiune!
Dear Mr Leonard and Mr Popescu,
Having read your report on the EU’s relations with Russia, I would like
to say that, while it contains many interesting points, your work is
ultimately very disappointing.
I cannot dwell on details. However, as a general comment I think you
err:
1 – By failing to accept that Russia under Putin actually has seen a
restoration of legality and order, as well as democracy. Obviously,
there is still much to be desired, but the system is moving in the right
direction by leaps and bounds (and I would argue that all countries,
even the best developed have problems on this front, as perfect rule of
law is a utopia).
What Putin has built is not an “autocracy”, but sovereign democracy,
which unlike most EU countries (most damagingly in Germany’s case)
places a premium on ignoring the precepts handed to it by the United
States. If being a part of the “West” means pulling the line determined
overseas, than Russia is better off by not to being a part of it.
Sovereign democracy (the ability to evolve in line with one’s own
“genetic code”, without interference) is a more valuable property,
yielding a more successful and stable system in the long run. This has
been the secret of Putin’s resounding success. On the other hand, the
“genuine” but manipulated-by-the-West “democracy” of the Ukraine brand
is a recipe for disaster.
Incidentally, your narrative to the effect that the rise of Putin has
been engineered by a group of “political technologists” reminds of the
very unfortunate opus in The Economist several months ago, where the
theme was that the rise of Putin has been a conspiracy of the “siloviki”
(ex-KGB etc). This is a version of the “eternal reds” conspiracy, which
implicitly holds that Russia is inherently evil and will never change.
Why can’t we for once have an intelligent theory of Russia devoid of
primitive conspiracy theories?
My reading is that someone had to step in to prevent the country’s
disintegration, and the fact that this person (or a group) happened to
be an ex-KGB operative is immaterial. (Perhaps it is not accidental, as
the KGB recruited some of the most gifted people, who came to have an
exposure to the West and understood only too well the failures of
totalitarianism). The key point is that he, and his associates, are by
all evidence very capable, modernisers well suited to execute this
incredibly difficult manoeuvre.
In my opinion, they have introduced new thinking, leaving the West
seriously behind.
2 – By overestimating Moscow’s desire to split up the EU and/or cause
trouble, for example, through the vehicle of Kosovo.
The truth is that the EU is chronically unable to evolve a unified
stance on energy, because this is a strategic issue where no nation will
compromise. The EU members compete (and will continue to compete) with
each other (and protect themselves from potential EU predators)
regardless of any “Russian conspiracy”.
As regards Kosovo, I am sure you are aware that it is Moscow who is
preventing an irresponsible policy of providing a precedent for UDI in
Europe. It is doing the same in Georgia.
3 – By overestimating Russia’s desire to be a part of G7 or the EU.
Actually the Kremlin no longer cares about such trivia, as the global
balance of power is shifting away from the West anyway. G7 is an
increasingly irrelevant talking shop.
————
I think you have a valid point about the rule of law when it comes to
Khodorkovsky and revision of the PSA deals in Sakhalin.
Yes, Moscow probably believes (more than is the case in the West) that
power ultimately determines the shape of law. But these are still early
days in the system’s (the post-Soviet Russia’s) evolution, and the
survival of the country as an integrated entity must take precedence
over legal niceties. After all, it has been dealing with the likes of
Khodorkovsky, who widely flouted the law (or manipulated it to their
narrow personal advantage). In this context, the regime’s use of similar
such tactics is understandable.
As regards the revisions of the PSAs, yes the Kremlin has applied undue
pressure and has acted incorrectly, but it probably had little choice.
The agreements were concluded when the prices of hydrocarbons were very
low and when the state was desperately weak – allowing its partners to
take advantage. Indeed, why the Russia’s foreign partners feel they were
justified in exploiting the country’s weakness? The tables have now
turned, and the Kremlin would have been in the dereliction of its duties
if it failed to act accordingly.
Finally, when it comes about the rule of law the EU hardly has the right
to lecture anyone as its own laws and regulations – in fact some of its
most fundamental principles, such as the “free movement of labour” – are
often ignored, or arbitrarily interpreted.
For example, the Constitution Treaty has been forced through despite its
rejection by the French and Dutch referenda. You know very well that the
EC will not take “No” for an answer and will continue to ignore its
defeats on such strategic issues, come what may. We know why: the very
future of the EU is at stake.
But this is the same as the Kremlin under Putin has been doing.
In my opinion, the way forward is not through policy prescriptions
listed in your Report, but in the EC’s acceptance of Russia’s “new
thinking”. Unfortunately, your Report has contributed to further
entrenchment of the pernicious dogmatism on the Western side. I suggest
you wipe the slate clean and start again.
Best regards,