marti am prezentat la bruxelles studiul pe rusia – cateva intalniri in consiliu si o prezentare in dg relex la comisia europeana. au fost 15 persoane. in general reactiile sunt foarte pozitive. denota un sentiment ca studiul spune ce cred multi care se ocupa de rusia in UE, dar nu o pot spune in public.

in studiul pe rusia categorizam statele UE in dependenta de atitudinea lor fata de rusia. printre altele numim irlanda un “pragmatic rezervat” fata de rusia – stat care apreciaza afacerile cu rusia, dar nu ezita sa vorbeasca deschis despre problemele cu rusia si evolutiile ne-democratice. acum cateva zile ministrul de externe irlandez dermot ahern intr-o cuvantare s-a referit la acest studiu spunand:

“A recent report published in Brussels included Ireland among a group of EU countries described as “frosty pragmatists” as regards relations with Russia. I cannot agree. Yes, we proceed on the basis of what is pragmatically possible. We accept that there are significant differences between us. And there are aspects of Russia’s internal development which we find troubling.”

Printre altele mai spune

This turnaround has undoubtedly created a resurgent Russia not shy at defending its views and interests internationally. Russian pride has in a sense been reborn. Aspects of these changes are unsettling and challenging. There are real concerns about the pressure on some key civil and political liberties. Some high-profile individual cases have been deeply shocking and alarming.

We will relate best and co-operate most easily with a Russia in which the rule of law prevails and power is moderated by institutions, including an independent judiciary, a politically pluralist legislature, a robust media and a confident civil society.

In this regard, I must say that Ireland profoundly regrets the circumstances which led ODIHR to conclude a week ago that it could not usefully observe the forthcoming Duma elections. We value highly the unique methodology and expertise that ODIHR has built up over many years and its well-earned reputation for impartiality and independence.

Cu alte cuvinte – spune exact ce ar spune un “pragmatic rezervat” fata de rusia. Nu prea mi-l imaginez pe Schroeder, Berlusconi sau Moratinos/Zapatero spunand ca ceea ce vad ei in rusia este “profund socant si alarmant”. intregul discurs e mai jos.

Annual Conference of the Royal Irish Academy Committee for International Affairs
23 November 2007

‘Russia’s Global Perspective:
Defining a new relationship with Europe and America’

Opening Statement on behalf of Mr Dermot Ahern TD
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Professor Slevin
Excellencies
Ladies and Gentlemen

I am very pleased, on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to deliver the opening address at this Conference, which has come to provide a forum for some of the most important annual exchanges in Ireland on international issues.

This year, the RIA has very appropriately chosen to focus on Russia whose remarkable internal consolidation over recent years has transformed the dynamics of its external relations, not least with Europe and the US. The seminar is taking place against a backdrop of strained relations, and misunderstandings which frequently obscure our mutual interests. There is an active debate, both inside Russia and in Europe and the US, on Russia’s future international role. Within Russia, with differing perceptions of events since the early 1990s, there are voices calling for a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy away from that forged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the West, there is a wide spectrum of responses to a resurgent Russia increasingly asserting its views and interests.

Given the forthcoming political transition in Russia, but also future change in both Europe and the US, this conference is particularly timely. Next month’s Duma elections followed by the Presidential election in March will be an important milestone. In Europe, the Lisbon Treaty will equip the EU with the means to ensure greater effectiveness, unity of purpose and cohesion in its external relations, including in its engagement with Russia. In the US, transition has begun with the lead-up to next year’s Presidential election. Each of these changes will affect the range of relationships between the three.

Today’s exchange is also opportune given the urgency of a number of major international issues, notably Kosovo and Iran, on which Russia has a central role.

It is however worth at the outset reminding ourselves how truly exceptional a country is Russia. Even following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it remains a land of superlatives – the largest country on the planet, covering almost one ninth of the land surface of the globe, stretching across eleven time zones, with a unique endowment of natural resources. It is a massive Eurasian landmass on the periphery simultaneously of Europe, North East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia.

It remains nonetheless culturally and historically European. But not West European. That is an important distinction. Substantial differences have isolated Russia from some of the principal trends of European history. In the 20th century, it experienced autocratic Tsarism followed by 75 years of a totalitarian Soviet regime and the indescribable horrors endured by the Russian people during the Second World War. The decade of extraordinary political, social and economic turmoil which followed independence, and a brutal internal conflict in Chechnya, have also marked Russia apart. Inevitably, transition has been more fraught and complex than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. There is perhaps inadequate awareness in the West of the full impact of that legacy which deprived Russia of the basic building blocks to construct a political system and a civil society along lines familiar to us.

We also need however to remind ourselves of the remarkable transformation that has taken place over the last twenty years. Russia today is neither the sclerotic superpower of 1987 nor the weakened and chaotic state of 1997. It is a leading state of major potential which has made enormous strides towards social and economic modernisation. Today, Russia’s is the ninth largest economy in the world, larger than India or Brazil. In the first six months of 2007, capital inflow into Russia (including I should say Irish capital) was greater than during the entire 1990s. Less than a decade since the 1998 default, Russia has a stabilisation fund of over $110 billion and external reserves of around $450 billion. The IMF last week said that Russia’s contribution to global growth will be half that of the entire EU.

While this owes much to high commodity prices, it would not have been possible without the fiscal prudence of President Putin’s government, which has been a major factor in ensuring consistent economic growth of an average of 7% per annum over the past 7 years.

Rapid increases in disposable incomes have resulted in the emergence of a sizable middle class of consumers. Russians today are travelling abroad in ever-increasing numbers. While income disparities remain too wide, poverty has been halved over the past decade. Russians today are arguably freer, certainly in terms of their private lives, and certainly richer than at any time in their history. The emergence of a solid, property-owning middle class is quickly changing the character and expectations of Russian society and should over time have a significant impact on the political system.

This turnaround has undoubtedly created a resurgent Russia not shy at defending its views and interests internationally. Russian pride has in a sense been reborn. Aspects of these changes are unsettling and challenging. There are real concerns about the pressure on some key civil and political liberties. Some high-profile individual cases have been deeply shocking and alarming. However, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Nor is it on the way back to the eras of Stalin, of Khrushchev, or Brezhnev. To speak of a new Cold War is a gross exaggeration. I think to suggest otherwise would be a distortion of a complex transition in a country which is simultaneously moving in many directions at once. Many of these changes are constructive, others less so. However, the balance is, I believe, mainly positive for the Russian people, for many of whom stability and prosperity have an understandably high value.

As Russia prepares for a vital period of transition, attention inevitably focuses on personalities, particularly who will be the next President. However, the larger issues, which I know will receive attention here today, relate to how Russia will adapt to key policy challenges ahead. How will Russia create a diversified economy beyond oil and gas? Can there be an equilibrium between a strong central Government and a vibrant civil society? Can Russia live up fully to its international human rights commitments? What will be done to develop Russia’s human capital in face of its daunting demographics? What is it going to do to tackle corruption which, as President Putin himself acknowledges, continues to have a corrosive effect on society? Clearly these and other questions can be answered only by Russians themselves. The answers will however be of vital importance to both Europe and America.

We in Europe have a profound interest in a Russia that is strong and stable and confident about its future. The question, perhaps, is what we mean by that strength? We certainly want a Russia with an effective Government and administration. But we will relate best and co-operate most easily with a Russia in which the rule of law prevails and power is moderated by institutions, including an independent judiciary, a politically pluralist legislature, a robust media and a confident civil society.

In this regard, I must say that Ireland profoundly regrets the circumstances which led ODIHR to conclude a week ago that it could not usefully observe the forthcoming Duma elections. We value highly the unique methodology and expertise that ODIHR has built up over many years and its well-earned reputation for impartiality and independence. We cannot fail to be disturbed by this development and by the wider implications of Russia’s drive to subject the work of ODIHR to political oversight. We hope nonetheless that the forthcoming elections will be free and fair.

Many of Ireland’s interests with Russia are now pursued through the EU. However, bilaterally we continue to develop close contacts. We are looking forward to in-depth discussion on many of the key international issues at official-level political consultations in Dublin early next month. We are expanding our cultural and educational contacts and will next month sign a new programme of activities. We continue to support transformation through our participation in the Russian President’s training programme for Russian civil servants.

We are making a determined effort to expand Ireland’s economic relations with Russia. Exports of physical goods and services last year amounted to over €600million with a 33% increase in the year to date. Russia is of growing interest to Irish investors. At a recent meeting in Moscow, we were told that Ireland now ranks as the twelfth largest investor in Russia. The Government have provided funds for a series of projects to sustain Ireland’s penetration of various sectors of the rapidly growing Russian market. Our Embassy in Moscow and Enterprise Ireland have undertaken a series of initiatives to boost Ireland’s economic profile. We will next year host a high-level business event on Russia in Dublin to further raise awareness in Ireland of the growing opportunities of the Russian market and will also host a meeting of the Bilateral Economic Commission. In its White Paper on ‘A sustainable energy future for Ireland’, the Government committed itself to deepening our bilateral energy and political relations with third country natural gas suppliers, including Russia.

The EU’s engagement with Russia, covering a comprehensive range of issues from trade, energy and security to migration and climate change, is the Union’s most complex external relationship and its most important after that with the US. Russia is our third–largest trading partner, after the US and China. Around 70% of foreign investment into Russia comes from the EU while Russian investment into the EU is also growing rapidly. Russia supplies 30% of the EU’s oil and 50% of its gas. The relationship is underpinned by a dense web of institutionalised and high-level political dialogue. Indeed, no other State meets the EU as regularly as does Russia.

Despite the extent of this engagement, underlying misunderstandings have resulted in the disappointing failure to conclude a successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Indeed, it has not even yet been possible to begin negotiations. There is now a need for a new vision of the relationship based on common interests and leading to a deep partnership built around far-reaching economic integration of the whole of Europe, including Russia. Energy will be an important component of that partnership. Both sides need to maintain and improve energy security. For the EU, this means security of supply, for Russia security of demand. We need a stable and transparent framework to underpin this mutual dependence.

A vital element in building Russia’s future strength will be its capacity to move from dependence on commodities. Membership of the WTO is key to economic diversification. While an important stage in accession was concluded with the EU in May 2004 during Ireland’s Presidency, it is disappointing that today Russia remains the world’s largest economy outside the WTO. I pay credit to President Putin for his leadership and for resisting protectionist arguments against accession. He has articulated a clear vision of a diversified Russian economy as a member of the WTO, integrating with the rest of the world, attracting investment and growing trade. Russian membership of the WTO is of course also important for the EU, as it will not otherwise be possible to move towards a free trade area which is the logical next step in our relations.

The Council of Europe is another important arena of contact and co-operation with Russia. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Court in Strasbourg have made a uniquely European contribution to democracy and to international human rights protection. We were hugely encouraged when in 1996 Russia made its choice to become part of this European family. Since then, it has made progress towards honouring the obligations and commitments it undertook Given Russia’s size, its cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, and the particular legacy of its past, this process cannot be completed quickly. But there have been disappointments. We particularly hope that Russia will soon ratify Protocol 14 of the ECHR. The early entry into force of this Protocol is indispensable if we are to safeguard the functioning of the Court and by extension of the Strasbourg system of human rights protection as a whole.

Russia and the EU committed themselves in the Common Space on External Security of May 2005 to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on the international scene “in particular in regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders.” The reality is that now, with the enlargement of the Union, we share a common back yard. However, it should not be a surprise that we are still a long way from having developed a habit of cooperation on neighbourhood issues. In stepping up its relations with Ukraine, Moldova and others, the EU does not seek to displace those countries’ deep ties to Russia but to promote prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. We think Russia stands to benefit – but that there is no doubt that Russia does not entirely trust the EU on this. The situation is of course complicated by the issue of further NATO enlargement – perspectives on which can differ radically, depending on where one is sitting. We should all look forward to a time when the EU and Russia have learned to work together constructively on issues close to our homes – and the learning process is not for one side only. The challenge is to find a way to reconcile Russia’s own sense of its legitimate security needs with the right of sovereign nations to choose their own paths.

The deteriorating situation in Georgia is of real concern. In clamping down on peaceful opposition protests on 7 November, Georgia’s Government failed an important test. To support Georgia as it tries to get back on course, the EU plans a strong presence in the upcoming ODIHR Election Observation Mission. Georgia’s Presidential election on 5 January and its parliamentary election at a later date will reveal whether democracy has managed to put down roots since 2003 in this vulnerable country in a difficult neighbourhood. The EU is committed to deepen cooperation under the European Neighbourhood Policy with a democratic Georgia. It respects and supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and does what it can to defuse recurring tensions between Russia and Georgia, including in regard to the frozen conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addressing such issues, it is important that both the EU and Russia maintain a continuing dialogue and try to develop a clearer mutual understanding.

Of course, we pay particular attention to Russia’s global role and also to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Europe and the United States are bound together with Russia in seeking to resolve various international and regional challenges. Even a quick survey reveals the importance of Russia’s role. It is working constructively as a member of the Quartet on the Middle East Peace Process. It is playing an important role is carrying forward the six-party talks on North Korea. Ratification by Russia of the Kyoto Protocol was, for the EU, a significant step in international efforts on climate change, and continuing co-operation is vital.

As a nuclear State and permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has a key role on disarmament and non-proliferation, an issue of particular importance for us in Ireland.

There is I believe fundamental agreement on the key challenge of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, although clearly there can be tactical differences of approach. If this international effort is to succeed, and if diplomacy is to work, then it is vital that the Security Council, and particularly its permanent members, stay together. Russia’s role in pressing Tehran to look at ways out of the current dilemma is pivotal.

However, there are issues on which there can be real difficulty. At the moment, there is a major focus on Kosovo, given the imminent completion of the current negotiating process. Russia plays a very important role as a member of the UN Security Council, the Contact Group and indeed of the Troika, and it has a special relationship with Serbia. It was gravely disappointing that the Security Council failed to agree on a way forward based on the Ahtisaari report. While we all still hope for a negotiated outcome, there is a real danger that this will not happen. In that case, the European Union must collectively take a lead in facing up to its responsibilities. It will be vital that the international community as a whole, including Russia, do all possible to manage the situation calmly and to avoid any return to bloodshed in a region which suffered so much so recently.

A recent report published in Brussels included Ireland among a group of EU countries described as “frosty pragmatists” as regards relations with Russia. I cannot agree. Yes, we proceed on the basis of what is pragmatically possible. We accept that there are significant differences between us. And there are aspects of Russia’s internal development which we find troubling. However, our starting point has to be respect for Russia’s status and role, coupled with an understanding of its history and perspective on the world. Russia is a challenging but an indispensable partner for Europe and for the United States and will continue to play an essential international role in the decades to come.