am fost in octombrie la o conferinta despre UE si reglementarea conflictelor din Georgia, EU ISS Paris. iata si raportul de la conferinta scris de organizatori. (si un studiu scris la ceps in martie “Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia“). mai jos gasiti si cateva din impresiile mele de la acea conferinta (nu toate au fost spuse neaparat in public). unele relevante si pentru moldova.

EU and conflict resolution in Georgia

  • Georgia is the most obvious case where the intra-EU competition for political attention and resources between South vs Eastern neighbourhood is seen. France, Portugal, Spain, Italy block many things on the East. Greece does the same, but not because is that interested in the Mediterranean, but more from a Russia-first approach. The new EU member states tend not to block Southern priorities.
  • Southern EU member states refuse to see Moldova and Georgia as neighbours. They say it is a Russia business. Not used to treating them as a neighbourhood.
  • The EU knows much better its southern neighbours.
  • EU has two tools to be more active in the S. Caucasus: financial assistance and ENP Action Plans. BUT: financial assistance is less important for the states in the region than ever before. Russia offers lots of money + infrastructure projects + Sochi Olympics (business opportunities) for Abkhazia. All that reduces the attractiveness of EU funds.
  • France and Germany’s policies on Russia: changed political tone, but at lower levels where diplomats decide day to day issues in Bxl or elsewhere – the change has yet to be seen.
  • EUSR proposals on police liaison officers for Abkhazia and South Ossetia – collocated with UNOMIG and OSCE. These officers would think of how the EU could play a role in policing in the conflict areas. They will be deployed soon.
  • EUSR proposals on having liaison border officers for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia – is still blocked (after Greece vetoed that in April).
  • Georgia – increasing centralisation. Okruashvili was brutally dealt with. Maybe not in a physical sense, but Saakashvili showed that no opposition will be tolerated.
  • Georgia increasingly fears that EU engagement with Abkhazia and S. Ossetia will not lead to reintegration. So makes more and more obstacles for EU involvement in the conflict areas. + Georgia is increasingly impatient on the conflicts.

PS. si o carte recenta: Christoph Zürcher (2007). Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New York: University Press. (iata Introducerea).