am promis sa scriu si despre sustinerea doctoratului de pe 3 aprilie 2009. pe majoritatea cititorilor acestui blog nu ii intereseaza acest subiect, dar exista si o minoritate pe care ii intereseaza.

Istorie, cronologie si proces

am inceput doctoratul in septembrie 2003 la Universitatea Central Europeana, Budapesta (unde imi facusem si masteratul cu un an inainte). partial din cauza faptului ca am fost implicat in prea multe activitati paralele, a durat 5 ani si jumatate sa il termin. pe parcurs, mi-am schimbat de cateva ori tema, cadrul teoretic si studiile de caz. am inceput cu impactul ue asupra reglementarii conflictelor in cipru, macedonia si moldova; pana la urma am ajuns sa scriu despre politica (sau lipsa politicii) UE fata de conflictele post-sovietice: abkhazia, osetia de sud, nagorno-karabkh si transnistria. teza explica care sunt factorii ce determina implicarea sau ne-implicarea ue in reglementarea acestor conflicte. deci doctoratul este mai degraba despre procesul de luare a deciziilor in interiorul ue, decat despre conflictele propriu-zise.

am scris doctoratul in 5 orase si institutii diferite: CEU, budapesta (2003-2005); EU ISS (2005), paris; CEPS,  bruxelles (2005-2007), ECFR, londra, (2007-2009); si in noimebrie 2007 – mai 2008 – m-am retras la queens university, belfast, in irlanda de nord sa finisez doctoratul, sa rescriu capitolul teoretic (de fapt sa inventez un nou cadru teoretic), studiile de caz, si sa sudez intreg documentul. primul draft il aveam prin septembrie 2008.

Sustinerea tezei

3 aprilie, sala senatului la CEU, Budapesta. in comitet sunt Erin Jenne, conducatoarea mea de teza, Michael Merlingen de la departament si Dov Lynch, acum la OSCE. Karl Hall a prezidat apararea tezei. au mai fost vreo 15 persoane care au venit sa asculte si sa puna intrebari.

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sustinerea tezei, 3 aprilie 2009, CEU

prezentarea a durat vreo 25 de minute, si dupa aia au urmat intrebarile. unele din ele destul de dificile. pana la urma a mers bine. in total a durat 2 ore si vreo 15 minute. dupa aia comitetul se retrage pentru a lua o decizie (daca doctoratul este acceptat sau nu; in cazul in care raspunsul este da, urmeaza sa se decida daca este acceptat neconditonat sau daca este conditionat  de revizuiri minore sau substantiale; si ce titlu se confera pentru persoana care a sustinut teza). peste 10 minute comitetul a decis sa imi acorde titlul de “Doctor of Philosphy in Political Science Magna Cum Laude” (aici e explicatia termenului), care inseamna “with great honours”, si doctoratul este conferit fara necesitatea unor revizuiri. dupa aia sampanie, pranz, bere, si party in szimpla kert – localul meu preferat din budapesta :)

schimbari majore in viata mea nu au intervenit. mi-am pus in “phd” in semnatura din email, am modificat bio pe paginile web. in rest cum am fost la ecfr, asa si raman la ecfr in viitorul apropiat :) mai jos vedeti si “abstract”-ul doctoratului.

Stealth Intervention: The EU and Post-Soviet Conflicts

This dissertation addresses EU policy towards the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-Cold War period. It examines the dynamics of EU interventions in conflicts, asking: Why and under what conditions does the EU decide to get involved in conflict resolution? In a conflict-prone world and competing security priorities, what determines EU involvement in particular conflicts? Do supranational institutions, such as the European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, matter in initiating, shaping and implementing EU policies on conflict resolution? To answer these questions, I use institutionalist and intergovernmentalist theories to assess their relative explanatory power in accounting for the patterns of EU interventions in conflict. I find that these approaches are broadly complementary: institutionalism explains EU interventions in the low-politics areas of conflict resolution, while intergovernmentalism explains EU behaviour in the high-politics areas of intervention.

When it comes to intervention in conflicts, EU foreign policy is like a light airplane: it can fly without being caught on radar as long as it flies ‘low’. By flying low (and slow), such an airplane can advance quite far into ‘enemy’ territory. However, if it increases its altitude above a certain threshold, it risks being detected by radars, and actions may be taken to halt the aircraft. The same holds true for EU interventions in conflicts. To avoid challenging EU member states, EU institutions often employ stealth intervention, operating predominantly in uncontroversial and depoliticised aspects of conflict resolution. By “flying low,” they are thus able to gradually extend their mandate from low-politics areas of conflict resolution to the high politics realm of overt intervention. Using a strategy  I call “dosage”, EU institutions engage in a series of low-cost actions , which, over a longer period of time, can yield significant cumulated policy impact. However, if their involvement becomes suddenly controversial, as when EU institutions enter suddenly into the realm of high-politics, EU member states may move to limit their autonomy.

The dissertation traces the politics of stealth intervention by EU institutionsusing unpublished empirical data related to the EU decision-making process as well as interactions between the EU institutions, EU member states, and Russia in the conflict zones in question.  I find broad support for the theory of “dosage” across these cases. The use of this strategy by EU institutions in Transnistria has been largely successful because their engagement was perceived as non-threatening to the security interests of EU member states: the environment is largely non-violent, Russia is far, and the EU could influence conflict settlement patterns through trade and border-management assistance, rather than direct peacekeeping missions. However, in the more violence-prone conflicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, EU member states have stayed firmly in charge of the EU policy, and as a consequence, the proactive approach of EU institutions has been greatly constrained, often leading to failure to intervene.