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Ukraine’s favourite foreign policy game is called ‘multi-vectorness’ – a constant process of ‘eschewing choice‘ as this recent study explained. For years Ukraine sought to extract concessions and be treated nicely by both Russia and the EU or US not because it was sticking to its promises, but because it played sometimes skilfully and sometimes brazenly on contradictions between external actors. A simplified version of the rule of rules of the game, in its Ukrainian version, looks the following way:

1. Promise both Russia and the EU everything they might want to hear (usually integration into some Russian- or EU-led initiative);
2. Ask for something in exchange (market access, lower gas prices, financial assistance, opportunities for lucrative but opaque deals  etc).
3. Get what you asked and drag your feet on delivering on your promises.
4. If either the EU or Russia is upset for not getting what they were promised – threaten that you will intensify cooperation with the other external partner.

The truth is that this has mostly worked. (Not just for Ukraine, but also for Moldova under Voronin and at times Belarus’ Lukashenko or a whole series of Central Asian states, not to mention a plethora of historical case from Italian city-states in the Middle Ages, to Nasser’s Egypt and Tito’s Yugoslavia.) (more…)

http://jobs.economist.com/job/2171/senior-policy-fellow-on-russia-and-wider-europe/

On a recent trip to Ukraine for the Kiev Security Forum I asked some of the Ukrainian analysts whether Yanukovich will manage to become like Putin - a successful authoritarian leader able to retain firm political control for a long time. There is little doubt that Yanukovich would like to be like Putin and is trying to build a more or less similar system. But there are a number of differences. First, is that Ukraine does not have energy resources and Yanukovich therefore lacks the money to co-opt the elites and the public as widely as Putin could do.

But another important factor is how Putin and Yanukovich play their systems. Putin’s role in the Russian system is that of the ultimate arbiter between various elite groups. He is a moderator, not a player in the elite squabbles. He is not neutral, nor fair. During his presidency, his closest friends acquired vast assets, and there has been quite some redistribution of property. But Putin mainly tries to stay above the fray realising that this is an important power resource for him. This is how he makes himself indispensable to the multiple interests groups within the Russian elites. That is also why elites value him – he has the power and the skill to maintain some degree of balance between competing factions. (more…)

reactia mea scurta la aceasta stire din care rezulta ca reprezentanti ai diasporei cer crearea unui minister: iar minister….. lumea crede ca daca creezi birocratie se rezolva problemele… vedeti cat de eficace e ministerul tineretului… sunt categoric impotriva. e risipa de bani si resurse. iar ministri, iar masini de serviciu, iar soferi, iar bugete, iar impact pozitiv zero. ca sa rezolvi probleme tre sa ai vointa si resurse umane dedicate, nu minister. or vointa si resursele umane dedicate le poti avea si fara minister (MAEIE? cancelarie? presedintie?), iar un minister fara resurse umane si sprijin politic e foiae verde. daca tot se doreste sa se faca ceva pentru diaspora, decat sa irosesti bani pe un minister, mai bine s-ar aloca bugete ambasadelor ca acestea sa faca receptii cu diaspora 1-2 ori pe ani sau sa fie finantate direct grupuri din diaspora ca acestea sa organizeze niste activitati pentru copii in romana decat sa ii irosesti pe birocratie ineficace.

Cazul Kia a evidentiat problema parcarilor ilegale. Insa deocamdata reactiile atat ale autoritatilor, cat si a bloggerilor/activistilor/flashmobistilor s-au limitat la cazul Kia, nu la problema mai larga a parcarilor ilegale. E si normal ca au fost sarbatori si au trecut doar cateva zile. Insa problema principala nu e KIA, ci toate parcarile ilegale.

Un exemplu interesant este bloggerul popular rus Ilya Varlamov care lupta sistematic cu parcarile ilegale in Moscova. Cea facea? Detaliile sunt aici, aici si aici . Omul a iesit din online in offline, a luat cate un politist de manuta si i-a dus pe la parcarile ilegale ca acestia sa sanctioneze pe cei care incalca legea. Bloggerul a devenit trepttat activist. Acum este candidat la primaria Omskului. Omul are multe idei interesante – lectura obligatorie pentru orice primar sau potential primar din RM.

Cred ca urmatorii pasi trebuie sa fie:

Pentru Guvern/MAI

- Crearea unui grup de lucru privind curatarea orasului de parcari ilegale. se anunta un termen de 7 zile in care toate magazinele, bancile, etc etc care pretind ca au parcari trebuie sa renunte la acestea eliberand spatiul public. dupa aia urmeaza inspectii si amenzi. nu doar in ultima luna – dar periodic – odata la 2-3 luni se fac razii prin oras (neaparat cu camere TV in spate ca sa se faca publicitate sa stie toata lumea ca legea se aplica constant) pentru ca parcarile sa nu reapara dupa valul initial de controale.  Politistul Alexandru poate fi facut chiar sef de grup :)

- pentru a aduna informatie – se creaza linie telefonica in care cetatenii se plang pe parcarile ilegale.

Pentru bloggeri/activisti/flashmobisti

- Flashmobul de la KIA e doar primul. In loc de Occupy Wall Street se face ‘Occupy parcarile ilegale’. Le ocupi si daca apar probleme chemi politia. Sau…

- cand vezi o parcare ilegale – suni la telefonul de mai sus sau chemi politia. Sa faca proces verbal, etc etc.

tocmai revenit de la kiev security forum. impresii generale: ianukovici merge ca buldozerul inainte. sistemul e din ce in ce mai centralizat. insa probabil nu-i va reusi sa construiasca un sistem putinist consolidat. timoshenko + 3 alti fosti ministri in inchisoare . UE refuza sa semneze acordul de asociere (care include si dcfta) atata timp cat Timoshenko e in inchisoare. poroshenko a fost numit ministrul economiei (prin 2005, dupa revolutia portocalie, una din glumele politice care circula in ucraina zicea ca acea revolutie era de fapt o revolta a milionarilor de tipul lui poroshenko impotriva miliardarilor de tipul ahmetov si pinciuk. acum si unii si altii sunt intro barca). ucrainenii suparati pe sevciuc. in ultimii ani singurii care au pastrat legaturile cu sevciuc erau ucrainenii, si acu sunt suparati pe apropierea excesiva a acestuia de moscova, si faptul ca prima vizita a aceluia a avut loc la moscova, nu la kiev. maine la bruxelles. ‘circul ambulant’ de promovare a easi carnegie.

(da, da, acest post este despre Transnistria si Moldova. Cititi pana la sfarsit).

Acum cativa ani citeam un manual de istorie belgian care m-a surprins prin diferenta de abordare diferita de manualele de istorie est-europene, inclusiv cele din RM. Toti stim din scoala ca apogeul eroismului poporului roman, sarb sau rus se manifesta in timpul invaziilor strainilor cand ca raspuns la acestea mic si mare, bogat si sarac recurgeau la tactica pamantului pustiit – adica se dedeau foc la sate si orase, se ucideau animalele de asa, se otraveau fantanile, iar populatia se retragea in munti/paduri. Apoi reveneau si se apucau sa construiasca totul de la inceput. Dar mult mai saracita. Marea mi-a fost surprinderea citind in manualul de istorie belgian niste elogii aduse inteligentei si patriotismului liderilor unuia din orasele belgiene care au negociat cu invadatorii spanioli predarea orasului in schimbul pastrarii unor privilegii comerciale ale acestuia si evident nedistrugerea acestuia. (Iar noi ne mai miram de ce in Italia sau Belgia sau Olanda exista orase care au arhitectura de 500-600 de ani, iar in Moldova si restul Europei de Est nu prea.) In manual mai scria ca numai datorita bravilor lideri ai acestui oras care au demonstrat intelepciune prin faptul ca au negociat predarea orasului, acesta si-a patrat prosperitatea, pacea, si vietile omenesti. Pana la urma spaniolii oricum au plecat peste cateva decenii. Iar belgienii au ramas belgieni. Insa mai prosperi, si cu casele si afacerile intacte. Deci definitia vest-europeana a patriotismului este pe alocuri diametral opusa definitiei est-europene a patriotismului. Evident, nu trebuie absolutizata aceasta observatie. Si istoria est-europeana este plina de ‘pragmatici’, inclusiv Stefan cel Mare (care fara doze nesanatoase de ‘pragmatism’ nu mai rezista jumatate de secol pe tron), iar istoria vest-europeana de lideri care au aplicat tactica pamantului pustiit. Mai degraba difera modul cum este interpretata istoria acum, sau cum sunt proiectate interpretarile de acum in trecut.

Fast Forward.

Revista Economist. Marea Britanie. 2012. Se discuta intentia Scotiei de a organiza un referendum privind independenta in viitorul apropiat. Pozitia guvernului Marii Britanii fata de vestigiile fostei maretii e clara: decide populatia de pe loc. Daca locuitorii insulelor Falklands/Malvine, Irlandei de Nord, Gibraltarului sau Scotiei vor independenta – Londra nu are nimic impotriva. (more…)

It is standard practice to bash Catherine Ashton and how the External Action Service turned out. The story is of an inward looking institution, without having a grand narrative or strategic vision, and little credibility in either EU member states or EU’s external partners. It is hard to argue that EU foreign policy is doing well. But that is first and foremost because of structural factors – the economic crisis that drastically reduces EU’s foreign policy appetite and resources, as well as soft power appeal (see EU Foreign Policy scorecard 2012 for a similar assessment).

It is perhaps time to reconsider at least some of the standard, off the cuff, assessments of the EEAS. If one looks at some specific foreign policy dossiers, the reality is that of a gradually emerging political animal that can show its teeth if and when necessary (were the Soviet Union alive, its propaganda department would have have used the consecrated term of  ’zverinnyi oskal imperializma’ – the evil grin of imperialism), rather than a fat cat throwing money around as its recently dominant image used to be. (more…)

Am scris deja despre numirea lui Rogozin ca reprezentant al Rusiei pe Transnistria si despre faptul ca acesta este mult mai eficace in a-si face publicitate in politica interna ruseasca, decat in atingerea obiectivelor de politica externa a Rusiei. Dar iata ca citeam draftul unei carti scrise de un prieten de-al meu din UE (manualul unui consilier politic – The Political Advisor’s Handbook) si am dat de cateva pasaje care m-au facut sa revin la subiectul Rogozin. Mai ales in ajunul vizitei sale la Chisinau. In cartea inca nepublicata se discuta mai multe tactici de negocieri, inclusiv acestea doua:

Irrational behaviour. Irrational or awkward behaviour in a negotiation can be an effective tactic since it throws the other side off balance making it hard for them to assess your objectives and interests. Rational behaviour also tends to then be rewarded. This is of course a radical tactic that does little to foster long-term relationships or your reputation as a serious interlocutor. A related tactic is to act inconsistently with the expectations and perceptions of the other side.

Good cop/bad cop. This classic routine entails you acting as the good cop and your negotiating partner as the bad cop or vice versa. The good cop is friendly and sympathetic to the other party while the bad cop is hostile and tough. The bad cop makes harsh demands while the good cop apologises for the behaviour of his partner and pleads with the other side to make a concession to please the bad cop.

Rogozin foloseste din plin aceste doua tactici. Acesta genereaza valuri mari pe twitter sau in presa care sunt lansate inca inaintea aparitiei sale in persoana la Bruxelles sau Chisinau. Se presupune ca valurile reputatiei sale trebuie sa surpeze sistemele de aparare ale interlocutorilor sai de la distanta. Prin declaratii controversate, cerinte exagerate, glume zeflemitoare sau ofensive acesta de fapt incearca sa-si intimideze interlocutorii inca inainte de a se aseza la masa de negocieri cu ei. Acest stil diplomatic il ajuta sa atinga mai  multe scopuri: ii genereaza publicitate politica in Rusia, ii umfle imaginea de mare patriot, si ii permite sa joace simultan ‘good cop/bad cop’ – fiind bad cop in public, si ceva ceva mai ‘good cop’ in privat, dar nu prea mult.

(more…)

A year or so ago, while doing research for the post-BRIC Russia report, I spoke to a US diplomat dealing with Russia about the ‘reset’. He sounded (naturally) very positive about its effectiveness. Among its two key achievements he mentioned cooperation on transit to Afghanistan and  halt of anti-US propaganda on the Kremlin-controlled media and a subsequent decrease in anti-Americanism in Russia society.

With Putin’s return, protests in Russia and the US elections all talk is now about the end of the reset. In the last few months anti-American propaganda made forceful comeback in the Russian media. Many thought it was just electioneering in the run-up to the March presidential elections. But that was too optimistic, it seems. In the last few weeks things became even more heated. NTV, a Russian TV channel owned by Gazprom Media, has been following US ambassador Michael McFaul pretty much everywhere, which lead to an outburst of indignation from McFaul, as well as accusations that his phone (and therefore calendar) is hacked, and a formal US State Department protest over the harassment of the US ambassador. McFaul also claimed that upon arrival to Moscow last January he felt like he was back in the Cold War and that ’it has been surprising that there was so much anti-Americanism, because we thought we were building a different kind of relationship, and it makes some people nervous that it could so quickly and reflexively go back to – in terms of rhetoric – an era that we thought was behind us’. Then, on a different occasion, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov called McFaul ‘arrogant’. In other words, the dismantlement of what was considered a key achivement of the reset is well advanced. (more…)