Mon 2 Apr 2012
Rogozin’s travails in Moldova (EUobs)
Posted by nicu under eu observer , moldova , transnistria , ue-rusia[4] Comments
Brussels might have started to get used to the sharp-tongued former Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin, but Moldova is only in the early stages of doing so. After a stint in Brussels, Rogozin moved back to Moscow last December to be appointed deputy prime-minister in charge of the military-industrial complex. Rogozin is a Russian populist nationalist politician with huge (rumour has it that presidential) ambitions. A couple of weeks ago he was also appointed special representative of the Russian president on Transnistria (rather than on conflict settlement in Transnistria) and co-chair of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation. The move was badly staged. The Moldovans learned about it from the media. The appointment came in the same package as the nomination of two Russian regional governors (of Krasnodar Krai and North Ossetia) as ’special representatives’, read overseers, for the adjacent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And Rogozin on the third day of his new appointment called Moldova a ‘hencoop’ on his twitter account.
The Moldovans are worried, the EU unimpressed and both irritated. Clearly the appointment of Rogozin shows a much higher Russian political interest in Transnistria. The trouble is that when Russia would rather put up a show instead of cooperating – Rogozin is the right person to (mis)handle dossiers. Given that in the last couple of months there have been some hopes regarding conflict settlement in Transnistria after the long-serving Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov lost power to the younger Evgeny Shevchuk, the appointment of Rogozin is an ever bigger nuisance. Rogozin is likely to be more concerned with self-promotion than pursuing conflict-settlement. He is also likely to tighten Russia’s grip over Transnistria (Shevchuk recently spoke about adopting the Russian rouble as a currency). Rogozin’s double-hatting as co-chair of the intergovernmental commission with Moldova also give him plenty of economic levers (gas-prices negotiations and market access) into his hands that he is certain to apply to Moldova. His bulldozing style is also going to be much more intimidating for the Moldovans than to NATO member states. The EU itself is also going through a small transition as the former EU representative to the 5+2 talks on Transnistria, Miroslav Lajcak is moving from the External Action Service to the post of Foreign Minister of Slovakia.
Irrespective of Rogozin’s personal diplomatic style, it is not him who determines Russia’s foreign policy goals. Even though his appointment to NATO in 2008 was initially perceived as a clear snub, in the end he had to run along and even manage daily the US/NATO-Russian reset under Obama and Medvedev. The main problem the EU and Moldova are facing is not Rogozin, but Putin’s likely foreign policy style and ambitions in his new presidential term. Rogozin is a symptom not a cause of what might come in Russian foreign policy.
But ultimately, his ‘in-your-face’ and often intimidating negotiations style is often self-defeating. As a Brussels observer said about Rogozin’s stint in Brussels: ‘everything anyone told Rogozin immediately ended on Twitter. In the end, people stopped talking to him in confidence. Anyway, Rogozin’s “public diplomacy” actually undermined Russia’s policy on NATO.’ It might be the same on Moldova. Bad diplomats are ultimately Russia’s problem. A sharp-tongue might be good a good asset for domestic politics, but less so for diplomats operating in a competitive environment where Russia’s glory days are over. A Romanian-Moldovan proverb says that ‘a bird dies due to its own singing’ (’pasarea pre limba ei piere’) and it applies to diplomats more than to most other professions.
The best way to deal with Rogozin is to know what you want. A decade a ago, then a member of the Russian parliament, Dmitry Rogozin was Russia’s chief negotiator with the EU regarding the transit of Russian citizens to and from Kaliningrad via Lithuania. The Russian position was that the EU (Lithuania) cannot restrict the movement of Russian citizens from (mainland) Russia to (Kaliningrad) Russia. Russian negotiation tactics involved a lot of drum-beating, pressure on Lithuania and then attempts to have a deal with Brussels (and Berlin) over Lithuania’s head. None of it worked. The EU and Lithuania had a joint position that all Russian citizens should receive clearance to transit Lithuania, which was achieved through the so called ‘facilitated transit documents‘.
The key lesson is that for all of Rogozin’s skill and style he is no match to a united, determined negotiator who knows what it wants. Virtually everyone remembers Rogozin as the Russian negotiator on Kaliningrad, and no one the EU negotiators, but name recognition is not necessarily a recognition of success. This is the way to proceed for the EU. The best way to deal with Rogozin will be the deepening of EU-Moldova integration through faster moves towards deep and comprehensive free trade and a visa-free regime, as well as getting a foothold in Transnistria through assistance and engagement. If achieved in the next two-three years, this will also help conflict-settlement with or without Rogozin handling the dossier a few years down the road.
April 2nd, 2012 at 10:38 am
Personally, I believe that Rogozin’s appointment will neither be a major obstacle nor a boon to the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, but will be utterly irrelevant. After all, beyond irking Moldovan and EU officials, what difference will Rogozin’s presence do on substantive matters? Surely he may hinder the renewed cooperation on practical matters between Moldova and the separatists that followed Shevchuk’s election, but even this is not certain, and the renewed ties were threadbare to begin with. The truth of the matter is that the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is as distant today as it was twenty years today and it is difficult to see how the situation could change drastically in the foreseeable future. IMO the biggest reason for this is that in spite of the steadfast rhetoric of “territorial integrity” and “national sovereignty”, it is becoming increasingly clear to the Moldovan authorities (and to a smaller extent to the public at large) that reintegration of Transnistria in a unitary state is becoming not only an increasingly distant prospect, but also a rather undesirable one. After all, in practical terms, what interest would Moldova have in reabsorbing an even more impoverished and corrupt chunk of land that has racked millions of dollars in debt, that has a virulently anti-Romanian/anti-Moldovan population (to a large extent even including that one-third and shrinking ethnically Romanian population), and which is largely only kept afloat by Russian subsidies. But of course, it would be political suicide for anyone to express such sentiments in public….
April 9th, 2012 at 4:26 am
Nice analysis. I’d though focus on some issues that the text above did not cover, or did so superficially. First, the appointment of Rogozin may very likely indicate that the Western hopes of Russia willing to make concessions on Transnistria, for whatever purpose (peacekeeper image, improve post-Georgia war position, etc.) were wrong. That has significant policy implications as much of EU (or German more specifically) foreign policy on this issue was counting on Russia’s lenient approach.
Secondly, it does suggest that Russia for some reasons views Transnistria being valuable for itself. It is then important to understand what is this value for the Russian leadership. Only this way one could then try to bargain effectively. Thirdly, even though the text above seem to be optimistic, it totally ignores one specific thing. The appointment of Rogozin is disastrous for at least one reason: it will most probably kill the biggest opportunity Chisinau and its Western partners had in 20 years, which emerged after the election of Shevciuk in the secessionist region. This is huge, and then one can presume that this may be the Kremlin’s goal – to stall any forward motions (read progress) in the conflict resolution process, and close the windows of opportunities that recent elections in Tiraspol may have opened. Then, then next step will be to either press Shevchuk to work with Russia or discredit him and have repeated “elections” which would bring to power a more preferable to Moscow person.
April 9th, 2012 at 4:41 am
@Peter
In political science Rogozin’s appointment would be labeled as a signal, showing a more accurate picture of where Russia stands. Having a sort of “special representative” does indicate that the issue has been elevated on the list of Russia’s preferences. Besides, the personality of Rogozin makes a big difference. He will make sure that the issue stays on the public agenda, and by his media escapades he will push Kremlin to keep the Transnistira’s issue in loop, and be more active than before. He will be also creating a public opinion in Russia which will favor harder Russia’s stance on the issue – it will put Transnistria back on the Russia’s foreign policy map.
Actually I believe you are totally wrong when you say that the prospect of reintegration of Moldova is bleak. I think I understand what are you assumptions generating this view, but I believe your assumptions are not accurate. First, you should consider the nature of the public/constituency in Moldova (both east and west banks of Nistru). Under certain conditions they (especially in Transistria) will accept whatever deal the elites will achieve. The participation of public in policy is minimal, as the public will accept almost any deals that would improve their life/not deteriorate it. People is very apolitical, and except for a few pensioners who dream of the return of USSR, people are not that anti-Moldovan. The election of Shevchuk just shows very well what are the public preferences (recall how much he was portrayed as a pro-Western figure, and anti-Russia). So, actually I believe the prospects for reintegration are really solid.
Your are also mistaken when you rationalize about why Moldova would need a region which is so poor and so on. You just underestimate how conservative societies (ant not only) are very territorial and nationalistic (also in a civic nationalism meaning). States have been fighting wars for some cliffs in the sea, which had no material value whatsoever. There are many more to say here, but this post is becoming too long. I just believe you may want to reconsider your underlying assumptions about RM’s political class and population values and preferences.