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As the ‘post-Cold War era’ turned into the ‘multipolar world’ era, the notion of Western democracy promotion underwent similarly dramatic changes. The West became too weak to pursue democracy-promotion head-on and was seen as being forced to fall back on old-school realist approaches to democracy. But just when this realist approach to democracy-promotion seemed to almost finally become dominant, the popular wave of protests in EU’s southern neighbourhod changed everything again. Now the question is what will come next.

The Realist Consensus

For the few couple of years the realist consensus on democracy promotion seemed to be on a seemigly unstoppable (repeated) rise. It marked the end of two decades of noisy, often arrogant, but equally often concerned tough talk and action to promote human rights and democracy. The idea was that time has come to focus on achieving certain, rather quantifiable interests, such as ensuring security, fighting terrorism, expanding trade or managing migration, rather than adopting vague goals like promoting human rights and improving governance. (more…)

Having spent most of the week in Tunisia, here are some thoughts and observations.

The mood

… is very positive. It is not the end of a president (like Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004), but the end of an era. Since independence in 1956, Tunisia had only two presidents – Bourghiba and Ben Ali who ruled for 30 and 23 years respectively. In this sense Tunisia feels a bit like Central and Eastern Europe in late 80s-early 90s.

Confusion

There is a lot of optimism, but even more short term confusion. There is no clear understanding, nor agreement on what to do the following weeks and months. There are no institutions, no leaders and no united platform of dissidents, NGOs or oppositionists (like Solidarnosc in Poland or Saakshvili in Georgia) to stir the country through the next months. The interim president is unelected with little legitimacy, there is no parliament, the interim government is very weak politically, and under constant assault from protesters who want jobs, salary raises etc. So far the government had to accede to most of the demands of the protesters, since it has little power to say no. With such tempo the country can easily go bankrupt (add the outflow of tourists, uncertainties of the investors etc).

The starting point of post-revolutionary transitions in Serbia, Georgia or Ukraine were much better, and even there many of the results are mixed. (more…)

Just when the southern neighbourhood of the EU is shaken by a wave of revolutionary situations that toppled consolidated dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, the eastern neighbourhood seems to be in the middle of a trend towards authoritarian consolidation. So the paradox is that whereas the Southern neighbours look like those in the East in the revolutionary years of 2003-2005, but in fast forward mode, the Eastern neighbourhood seems to look increasingly like the south a few years ago – a collection of states with increasingly close economic relations with Europe, but with centralised, non-competitive politics, which routinely afford to ignore the EU on many political and security questions. Today, every country in the Eastern neighbourhood except Moldova is less pluralistic than it was 5 years ago (though Belarus arguably could not become worse).

Seen from Ukraine, Moldova or most of the new EU member states one of the most irritating aspects of the European neighbourhood policy is that it dumps together the Southern and the Eastern neighbours of the EU. The Eastern neighbours tend to be rather arrogant about the Mediterannean neighbours of the EU. (more…)

In 2003 -2005 revolutions in the neighbourhood were all the rage. Georgia, Ukraine and Lebanon have all inspired high-hopes among their own populations, as well as the EU and US. Then, many of those hopes collapsed, the revolutions lost their glitz, and the EU and US settled for a revolution-sceptic mood. Having gone through enthusiasm and then fatigue for revolutions, the EU now has to have views on revolutions again. It would rather not. But in less than two months the EU neighbourhood has been agitated by revolutionary situations in Belarus, Albania, Tunisia and now Egypt.

Coming up with coherent EU responses to today’s ‘revolutions’ is more difficult. (more…)

Throughout the 90s in Central and Eastern Europe, and later in the Balkans reformism and democracy tended to go hand in hand. Governments which were more respectful of democratic norms, also tended to be more reformist. (By ‘democracy’ I mean respect for human rights, media freedoms and opposition parties. And by ‘reformism’ I mean the implementation of reforms such as fighting corruption, cutting red tape, improving the business climate, modernising state institutions like police, customs, tax inspectorates  or the border guards.)

In a sense, the 90s was a simpler world in which Meciar, Tudjman or Milosevic were undemocratic and non-reformist; whereas Dzurinda, Mesic, and Djindjic were both reformist and democratic. The good and the bad guys were obvious; the black was clearly distinguishable from the white. And the EU’s approach to these governments was shaped by this unbreakable link between reformism and democracy.

But it seems that the Eastern neighbourhood is different. There is much more grey than black and white. Categorising the likes of Yuschenko, Timoshenko, Saakashvili, Putin and Medvedev is more difficult. (more…)

dupa cum am promis incerc sa recuperez pe blog, inclusiv cu unele impresii de la niste evenimente din ultimele 1-2 luni. in noiembrie am fost la doua evenimente organizate de European Stability Initiative (ESI). ESI sunt inventivi si deseori te provoaca sa iesi din zonele de confort intelectual.

conferinta cu pauze muzicale si artistice (inclusiv un filmulet de pavel braila)… din astea se intampla doar la viena. iata cateva secvente video si informatii suplimentare, tezele lui rainer munz; rory stewart e tipul care a traversat afganistanul pe jos in iarna 2002; si un blog post de Rumeli Observer/Gerald Knaus (da, da e vorba de fortareata din Istanbul) inspirat de aceasta dezbatere.

si cateva elemente din prezentarea mea:

Is Europe really a continent in decline – and what kind of foreign policy can such a continent pursue?

• Broader picture – it is not so much decline, as ‘relative decline’. This is not decline, but rather insufficient growth because others are rising faster. Relative decline is growth, but insufficient growth.

• In the East the EU is more present than ever. Ru, Az and Md have over 50% of their trade with the EU. Crisis-management missions in Georgia and Moldova. DCFTA talks, Association Agreements, visa-facilitation and visa-free talks. More contacts than ever before– visits, ministerials, summits etc. 5 years ago – EU had delegations only in Ge and Ua. Now in all 6 EaP states.

• The EU is more present, but not necessarily more powerful. (more…)

A aparut o stire conform careia Catherine Ashton a propus desfiintarea posturilor de reprezentanti speciali UE (RSUE) pentru Moldova si Caucazul de Sud. Functiile acestora urmeaza a fi preluate de catre ambasadorul UE in Moldova (cu Caucazul de Sud e mai complicat caci acolo sunt 3 ambasade UE). Articolul care anunta aceasta perspectiva incepe cu vaicarelile obisnuite – ca iata inca un semnal negativ fata de vecinatatea estica, inca un semn ca nu este prioritate, si toata colectia de acuzatii la adresa UE. Ca sa ne dam seama mai bine de context, si ca sa minimizam inca un val de vaicareli si speculatii legate de UE iata cateva precizari:

1) propunerile lui Ashton inca nu sunt acceptate de statele membre. sunt doar propuneri. Mandatele celor 11 RSUE sunt prelungite doar pana in septembrie. Pana atunci urmeaza sa fie decis care din aceste posturi vor fi eliminate din organigrama UE, si care nu. Personal banuiesc ca majoritatea acestora vor disparea. Vor ramane doar cativa RSUE – insa nu pentru ca asa stau prioritatile E, ci pentru ca ei acopera regiuni intregi (Orientul Mijlociu, de exemplu) si acest post nu poate fi oferit unui ambasador UE din regiune (de exemplu ambasadorul UE in Israel). In cazurile RSUE pentru tari aparte ca Moldova sau Afganistan – situatia este clara, acestea urmeaza fi comasate cu postul de ambasador UE in tara respectiva.

2) numirea RSUE intotdeauna a fost o solutie imperfecta si temporara pentru a mari vizibilitatea UE. RSUE Moldova a fost numit pe timpurile cand UE inca nu avea delegatie/ambasada la Chisinau. RSUE Caucazul de Sud a fost numit in 2003 cand UE avea delegatie doar la Tbilisi, nu si la Baku si Yerevan. Deci ambii RSUE aveau obiectivul de a compensa temporar insuficienta de prezenta si vizibilitate a UE. (more…)

‘post-mortem’ hibernal incoerent… sunt de aproape 5 ani in think-tankuri europene, timp in care am trecut prin3 dintre cele mai influente centre de cercetare care lucreaza pe UE: eu iss, ceps si ecfr. am avut mai multi prieteni care au lucrat in think-tankuri.  in mod normal dupa 5-6-7 ani majoritatea au plecat sa lucreze pentru alte organizatii: ue, ministere de externe ale statelor membre ue, osce, efta… unii merg in universitati. think-tankingul este un tip de activitate in care multi sau isi incep cariera (si lucreaza pana pe la 33-35 de ani), sau si-o incheie (dupa 55-60). mai rar intalnesti si unii care isi iau o pauza de 1-2-3 ani de la jobul principal pentru a scrie ceva in vreun centru de cercetare. sunt foarte putini think-tankeri care au petrecut intreaga viata profesionala in acest domeniu. este usor sa-ti imaginezi oameni care petrec 20 de ani in universitati, dar nu in think-tankuri.

sa lucrezi pentru centrele de cercetare este interesant si dinamic. centrele de cercetaresunt situate undeva intre lumea academica/universitara si instititutiile publice si organizatiile internationale. esti mult mai conectat la viata reala, si lucrul este mult mai dinamic decat mediul universitar. spre deosebire de teoriticienii din universitati, esti mult mai conectat la procesul de luare a deciziilor. oficialii deseori vor sa testeze sau sa discute idei. (more…)

It is not difficult to be depressed about the EU these days. A recent re-read of the Laeken declaration that set in motion the whole European Convention, the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties exercises just made me think (more) how far is EU’s current state (and institutional basis) from the stated ambitions of 2001. Here us a useful reminder of the spirit of the declaration:

“What is Europe’s role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall… The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights…  Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism… In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs.”

The truth is that throughout most of its existence the EU was as frustrating and depressive for its supporters as is it now. And yet, it still is the single most successful international organisation in history. So how do we balance euro-pessimism and optimism, history and future, success and failure, analysis and wishful thinking? (more…)

In light of the Tagliavini report, it is perhaps worth discussing in greater details EU’s performance in Georgia’s conflicts as well. We all know that both Georgia and Russia (with South Ossetia) are responsible for escalating the game around the conflicts zones and ruthlessly rushing into a downward spiral of militarisation of the conflicts zones, particularly after Kosovo’s declaration of independence and Georgia’s perceived moves towards NATO in the first half of 2008. But EU failures are also worth discussing. The report only refers to them en passant:”over the years there was a gradual increase in European involvement in Georgia, which may be called forthcoming in terms of economic aid, politically friendly on the bilateral side, cooperative but cautious on contentious political issues and … mostly distanced [from] sensitive security issues. A good case in point was the European reluctance to take over the Border Monitoring Mission on the Caucasus range facing Russia, after Russia had vetoed the hitherto OSCE engagement in 2004.”

Behind this carefully calibrated phrase lies the story of EU’s failure to engage in conflict-resolution. (more…)