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il puteti citi aici: despre calitatea si frustrarile diplomatiei ruse, relatiile cu UE, Moldova si Romania, politica externa a AIE-2, Prokhorov, China, Romania-Moldova si alte subiecte putin relevante pentru realitatile moldovenesti globale.

in privinta Moldovei: politica externa a AIE a fost destul de buna in acest sens – pastrarea unei relatii calme si neconflictuale cu Rusia, si intre timp apropierea de UE. Cea mai mare problema insa in aceasta ecuatie tine de viteza extrem de mica, si in mai multe sectoare chiar lipsa unor reforme cu adevarat pro-UE. Deci AIE are o formula de politica externa buna, insa aceasta formula nu va duce Moldova prea departe fara un algoritm de reforme interne mult, mult mai pronuntat.

As the ‘post-Cold War era’ turned into the ‘multipolar world’ era, the notion of Western democracy promotion underwent similarly dramatic changes. The West became too weak to pursue democracy-promotion head-on and was seen as being forced to fall back on old-school realist approaches to democracy. But just when this realist approach to democracy-promotion seemed to almost finally become dominant, the popular wave of protests in EU’s southern neighbourhod changed everything again. Now the question is what will come next.

The Realist Consensus

For the few couple of years the realist consensus on democracy promotion seemed to be on a seemigly unstoppable (repeated) rise. It marked the end of two decades of noisy, often arrogant, but equally often concerned tough talk and action to promote human rights and democracy. The idea was that time has come to focus on achieving certain, rather quantifiable interests, such as ensuring security, fighting terrorism, expanding trade or managing migration, rather than adopting vague goals like promoting human rights and improving governance. (more…)

pentru mine personal revolutiile din tunisia si egipt ridica intrebarea daca aceste revolutii vor esua sau nu. uneori am impresia ca majoritatea revolutiilor esueaza (revolutiile per se reusesc, insa consecintele revolutilor sunt contra-revolutionare): fie sunt deturnate de radicali (rusia/urss in 1917, iran in 1979) si duc la un fel de reinstaurare a unor regimuri la fel de nedemocratice (animal farm sau kyrgyzstan dupa 2005), fie regimurile democratice sunt atat de haotice incat cetatenii ajung sa isi aminteasca cu nostalgie de vemurile pre-revolutionare (ucraina dupa 2005, rusia in anii 90). sau pana la urma revolutiile nu sunt nici esecuri, si nici succese, ci pur si simplu niste virgule in dezvoltarea unui stat (liban si revolutia cedrilor din 2005). din revolutiile recente am impresia ca revolta anti-milosevic in serbia a fost o revolutie de succes, si georgia – un fel de semi-succes (consolidare reusita al statului, dar nu si al pluralismului politic).

si prin urmare intrebarea e cum transformi o revolutie care  a avut loc intr-un impuls pentru transformarea de succes al unui stat? in cazul egiptului si a tunisiei – care vor fi consecintele revolutiilor? dictaturi militare in locul dictaturilor lui ben ali si mubarak? noile guverne din egipt si tunisia sunt niste kerenskii si bakhtiari dupa care vor urma niste tipi mai brutali si mai eficace? vor deveni niste state de tipul pakistanului in care politicienii sunt fatada clasei politice, iar puterea reala e in mainile armatei? fratia musulmana la putere? si daca ajung la putere – ce se intampla cu islamistii? se transforma in musulman-democrati (echivalentul crestin-democratilor) ca AKP in turcia, sau devin reactionari ca iranienii? si daca sunt reactionari – poate chiar e nevoie de un stat islamist semi-esuat care sa trateze lumea de asteptarile utopice legate de islam (tot asa cum ‘realizarea’ visului socialist in urss a tratat o lume intreaga de tentatia comunismului ca alternativa de guvernare)? sau totusi revolutiile sunt un prim pas in directia haosului politic indelungat si indispensabil cu multe zigzaguri si ‘doi pasi inainte, unul inapoi’ care pana la urma duc la pluralism, asa cum s-a intamplat cu europa zguduita de revolutii odata la 20-30 de ani in sec 19?

dupa cum am promis incerc sa recuperez pe blog, inclusiv cu unele impresii de la niste evenimente din ultimele 1-2 luni. in noiembrie am fost la doua evenimente organizate de European Stability Initiative (ESI). ESI sunt inventivi si deseori te provoaca sa iesi din zonele de confort intelectual.

conferinta cu pauze muzicale si artistice (inclusiv un filmulet de pavel braila)… din astea se intampla doar la viena. iata cateva secvente video si informatii suplimentare, tezele lui rainer munz; rory stewart e tipul care a traversat afganistanul pe jos in iarna 2002; si un blog post de Rumeli Observer/Gerald Knaus (da, da e vorba de fortareata din Istanbul) inspirat de aceasta dezbatere.

si cateva elemente din prezentarea mea:

Is Europe really a continent in decline – and what kind of foreign policy can such a continent pursue?

• Broader picture – it is not so much decline, as ‘relative decline’. This is not decline, but rather insufficient growth because others are rising faster. Relative decline is growth, but insufficient growth.

• In the East the EU is more present than ever. Ru, Az and Md have over 50% of their trade with the EU. Crisis-management missions in Georgia and Moldova. DCFTA talks, Association Agreements, visa-facilitation and visa-free talks. More contacts than ever before– visits, ministerials, summits etc. 5 years ago – EU had delegations only in Ge and Ua. Now in all 6 EaP states.

• The EU is more present, but not necessarily more powerful. (more…)

Pe fundalul discutiilor privind modificarea constitutiei, organizarea sau neorganizarea unui referendum sau al alegerilor anticipate si recomandarile Comisiei de la Venetia mai are loc o discutie ceva mai generala despre dreptul suveran al Moldovei de a-si alege propria cale de dezvoltare si propria iesire din criza constitutionala. Fara indoiala, Moldova este un stat suveran care are dreptul sa isi aleaga propria cale de dezvoltare. Insa in afara dimensiunii pur moldovenesti  al discutiilor referitoare la suveranitate exista si un context politic si istoric mai larg de care trebuie sa fie constient orice stat care doreste sa adere la UE.

UE si suveranitatea

Uniunea Europeana si integrarea europeana inseamna anume delegarea suveranitatii, renuntarea partiala la egoismul statului national si crearea unor mecanisme de intruziune in afacerile interne ale unul altuia. Uniunea Europeana nu este altceva decat este un set de instrumente si parghii prin care statele membre se amesteca atat in treburile interne ale unui altuia, cat si in treburile interne ale candidatilor la aderare. Vrei, nu vrei, dar aceasta este Uniunea Europeana. Iar integrarea europeana nu poate avea loc in conditiile absolutizarii suveranitatii. (more…)

‘post-mortem’ hibernal incoerent… sunt de aproape 5 ani in think-tankuri europene, timp in care am trecut prin3 dintre cele mai influente centre de cercetare care lucreaza pe UE: eu iss, ceps si ecfr. am avut mai multi prieteni care au lucrat in think-tankuri.  in mod normal dupa 5-6-7 ani majoritatea au plecat sa lucreze pentru alte organizatii: ue, ministere de externe ale statelor membre ue, osce, efta… unii merg in universitati. think-tankingul este un tip de activitate in care multi sau isi incep cariera (si lucreaza pana pe la 33-35 de ani), sau si-o incheie (dupa 55-60). mai rar intalnesti si unii care isi iau o pauza de 1-2-3 ani de la jobul principal pentru a scrie ceva in vreun centru de cercetare. sunt foarte putini think-tankeri care au petrecut intreaga viata profesionala in acest domeniu. este usor sa-ti imaginezi oameni care petrec 20 de ani in universitati, dar nu in think-tankuri.

sa lucrezi pentru centrele de cercetare este interesant si dinamic. centrele de cercetaresunt situate undeva intre lumea academica/universitara si instititutiile publice si organizatiile internationale. esti mult mai conectat la viata reala, si lucrul este mult mai dinamic decat mediul universitar. spre deosebire de teoriticienii din universitati, esti mult mai conectat la procesul de luare a deciziilor. oficialii deseori vor sa testeze sau sa discute idei. (more…)

sunt la snow meeting in lituania. -10. lacul trakai. 30 de participanti, inclusiv 7 ministri de externe din UE + Iurie Leanca. dezbaterea pe Moldova are loc maine. se discuta politica UE si NATO fata de Rusia, extinderea, balcanii de vest etc. Lituania este un stat mic care incearca sa inteleaga si sa influenteze contextul strategic in care se afla. Poti fi de acord sau nu cu pozitia lituaniei fata de rusia sau georgia, dar lituania incearca sa aiba o politica externa. iar majoritatea absoluta a statelor central europene – dupa aderarea la ue si nato – au incetat sa aiba o politica externa si au pierdut sensul directiei. Unele state mici se agita sa aiba politica externa (inclusiv suedia, finlanda, danemarca etc), iar altele mai putin (slovacia, letonia, estonia, ungaria, bulgaria).

iata o incercare de a formula paradoxul statelor mici… Spre deosebire de statele mari, statele mici sunt mult mai afectate de factori externi pe care nu le prea pot controla sau afecta. Statele mari, din contra, au o mai mare influenta asupra tendintelor regionale sau globale, sunt mai auto-suficiente (cultural, economic sau politic). Deci ar fi logic ca statele mici sa fie mult mai interesate de ceea ce se petrece in afara granitelor lor. Daca nu pot influenta in mediul exterior, pai macar sa-l inteleaga mai bine ca sa poata naviga mai usor apele tulburi ale politicii internationale.

In realitate insa totul pare a fi invers. Statele mari (elitele politice, mass-media, diplomatii, oficialii) au un grad mult mai mare de curiozitate fata de ceea ce se intampla in afara lor decat statele mici. (more…)

It is not difficult to be depressed about the EU these days. A recent re-read of the Laeken declaration that set in motion the whole European Convention, the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties exercises just made me think (more) how far is EU’s current state (and institutional basis) from the stated ambitions of 2001. Here us a useful reminder of the spirit of the declaration:

“What is Europe’s role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall… The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights…  Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism… In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs.”

The truth is that throughout most of its existence the EU was as frustrating and depressive for its supporters as is it now. And yet, it still is the single most successful international organisation in history. So how do we balance euro-pessimism and optimism, history and future, success and failure, analysis and wishful thinking? (more…)

(with updates)… I have just returned from Germany from a joint ECFR-Bertelsman event on the “Eastern partnership or Partnership with Russia”. Of course, the answer is with both. No need to spend time on this. But I got a certain sense that the German debate on Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood might be changing. Of course this is only a snapshot and such trends are far from consolidated. And they have yet to trickle down through the German foreign policy machinery, not least in the Brussels committees. But here are some of the interesting nuances I have heard in my convesrsations with a few experts as well as FDP and CDU (the new coalition partners) voices.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany. (more…)

For almost two decades the driving force of EU foreign policy was the idea of the EU as a transformative power. “Transformation” was achieved by enlarging the union and exporting its acquis, values and prosperity. The EU managed to successfully transform Central and Eastern Europe (though the business is still unfinished) and push the Balkans in the right direction. Then the EU tried to transform the Eastern neighbourhood through a similar policy mix of dialogue, economic assistance and exporting the acquis, though all in reduced doses. (more…)