nicu popescu

The existence of divisions among Russia’s democratic forces is proverbial. But the same can be said of Russian nationalism. Nationalism is a movement that is not only increasingly split between an imperial, expansionist and (sometimes) cosmopolitan version, on the one hand, and an introvert, defensive and anti-immigrant one the other, but also in the throes of mutation as it attracts moderates and democrats who would previously have given it a wide berth.

This presents different challenges for everyone. The Russian government fears that a nationalist-democratic consolidation on an anti-Putinist platform would make a much more formidable adversary than the ‘official’ opposition allowed in parliament. Russian democrats also have their own dilemmas as their flirtation with nationalism is on the verge of evolving into a marriage of convenience, a combination that could produce either their elixir of life or a toxic poison.

From imperialist to defensive nationalism

Nationalism is like software that can run on different platforms – from Windows to Android. As nationalism normally has little to say about economic or social policies, it can easily merge easier with other left- or right-wing ideologies, increasing exponentially the number of mutations to which it can be subject. (more…)

OpenDemocracy.net, 6 December 2011: The preliminary results from Russia’s parliamentary elections are bad news for the Kremlin. Putin’s pet party, United Russia, got slightly less than 50% and it lost its constitutional majority in the Duma. That translates into a 14% fall from the last elections in 2007 for a party that had never seen its share of the vote decline at federal elections. The question now asked is a simple one: is this just a temporary setback or the beginning of the end for Edinaya Rossia and the Putin consensus?

By the standards of Western democracies, falling just short of the 50% mark after three years of global economic crisis and 12 years in power would be a stellar victory. But in Putin’s Russia this is a serious setback for two main reasons. First of all, the elections were neither free, nor fair. Evidence of ballot stuffing is already swirling around the internet, and the election campaign was heavily biased in favour of United Russia. Federal TV channels and local authorities worked hard to persuade and pressurise people to vote for United Russia. Under normal campaign circumstances and with no ballot stuffing Putin’s party would perhaps have got somewhere closer to 30-35% of the vote. The authorities know that. This is hardly a rock-solid foundation for the supposedly Teflon President Putin who wants to be a fatherly leader of the nation for a life-time. His lifetime.

(more…)

in ultimele luni am lucrat asupta unui raport despre politica externa a Rusiei. in sfarsit a aparut – Dealing with a post-BRIC Russia

iata si cateva reactii la raport de la diverse personalitati europene

Endorsements

“This report provides an important analysis of where Russia stands today and what opportunities this brings for the EU. It will open a much-needed and interesting debate.”

Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU; former Secretary General of NATO

“This report is extremely insightful both in its great analysis and policy recommendations proposed which touch upon both foreign, economic and energy policies. The report provides the European Union with a real working agenda.”

Massimo D’Alema, President, Italianieuropei Foundation; President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

un policy brief scris impreuna cu Andrew Wilson publicat astazi la ECFR despre politica europeana de vecinatate: Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

Just when the southern neighbourhood of the EU is shaken by a wave of revolutionary situations that toppled consolidated dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, the eastern neighbourhood seems to be in the middle of a trend towards authoritarian consolidation. So the paradox is that whereas the Southern neighbours look like those in the East in the revolutionary years of 2003-2005, but in fast forward mode, the Eastern neighbourhood seems to look increasingly like the south a few years ago – a collection of states with increasingly close economic relations with Europe, but with centralised, non-competitive politics, which routinely afford to ignore the EU on many political and security questions. Today, every country in the Eastern neighbourhood except Moldova is less pluralistic than it was 5 years ago (though Belarus arguably could not become worse).

Seen from Ukraine, Moldova or most of the new EU member states one of the most irritating aspects of the European neighbourhood policy is that it dumps together the Southern and the Eastern neighbours of the EU. The Eastern neighbours tend to be rather arrogant about the Mediterannean neighbours of the EU. (more…)

dupa cum am promis incerc sa recuperez pe blog, inclusiv cu unele impresii de la niste evenimente din ultimele 1-2 luni. in noiembrie am fost la doua evenimente organizate de European Stability Initiative (ESI). ESI sunt inventivi si deseori te provoaca sa iesi din zonele de confort intelectual.

conferinta cu pauze muzicale si artistice (inclusiv un filmulet de pavel braila)… din astea se intampla doar la viena. iata cateva secvente video si informatii suplimentare, tezele lui rainer munz; rory stewart e tipul care a traversat afganistanul pe jos in iarna 2002; si un blog post de Rumeli Observer/Gerald Knaus (da, da e vorba de fortareata din Istanbul) inspirat de aceasta dezbatere.

si cateva elemente din prezentarea mea:

Is Europe really a continent in decline – and what kind of foreign policy can such a continent pursue?

• Broader picture – it is not so much decline, as ‘relative decline’. This is not decline, but rather insufficient growth because others are rising faster. Relative decline is growth, but insufficient growth.

• In the East the EU is more present than ever. Ru, Az and Md have over 50% of their trade with the EU. Crisis-management missions in Georgia and Moldova. DCFTA talks, Association Agreements, visa-facilitation and visa-free talks. More contacts than ever before– visits, ministerials, summits etc. 5 years ago – EU had delegations only in Ge and Ua. Now in all 6 EaP states.

• The EU is more present, but not necessarily more powerful. (more…)

Corneliu Rusnac, moderator IMEDIA: Bună ziua stimaţi ascultători! Sunt Corneliu Rusnac şi vă salut la o nouă emisiunii de sinteze şi dezbateri pe teme de politică externă, emisiune realizată cu suportul Asociaţiei pentru Politică Externă şi finanţată de Fundaţia Friedrich Ebert.

Tema emisiunii noastre de astăzi va fi consacrată relaţiilor R. Moldova cu Federaţia Rusă ţinând cont de faptul că în ultimul timp în raporturile Chişinău cu Moscova au apărut unele elemente de tensiune. Invitaţii noştri din studio sunt dl Nicu Popescu, Consilier al Primului Ministru pe probleme de politică externă şi dl Victor Chirilă, Director Executiv al Asociaţiei pentru Politică Externă. Bună ziua şi bine aţi venit la emisiunea noastră!

Aşadar, cum pot fi calificate relaţiile dintre R. Moldova şi Federaţia Rusă la ora actuală. Dl Popescu? (more…)

Brainstorm la Bruxelles pe UE-Rusia. 4 ministri de externe UE. iata cateva citate interesante.  Ieri la Bxl a avut loc si reuniunea grupului de prieteni a Ucrainei – 14 state membre reprezentate.

Ukraine

“To Ukraine – don’t think you will get to the EU through geopolitics. Many EU states will be delighted if you are not part of the EU.”

“Ukraine lost herself. There is something Palestinian about it. They never missed a chance to miss a chance. They still don’t understand that you don’t  negotiate with the EU, you simply have to accept the EU acquis. This is very hard and humiliating, but the only way.” (more…)

(with updates)… I have just returned from Germany from a joint ECFR-Bertelsman event on the “Eastern partnership or Partnership with Russia”. Of course, the answer is with both. No need to spend time on this. But I got a certain sense that the German debate on Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood might be changing. Of course this is only a snapshot and such trends are far from consolidated. And they have yet to trickle down through the German foreign policy machinery, not least in the Brussels committees. But here are some of the interesting nuances I have heard in my convesrsations with a few experts as well as FDP and CDU (the new coalition partners) voices.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany. (more…)

o escala scurta la berlin ieri. am prezentat raportul pe politica de vecinatate la un eveniment comun organizat cu bertelsmann. interventii interesante din partea a doi parlamentari germani din CDU si FDP (care spre deosebire de parlamentarii din majoritatea celorlalte state chiar au influenta asupra politicii externe). din cate inteleg are loc o discutie ceva mai larga privind redefinirea accentelor din politica externa germana. discutia inca continua, dar am impresia ca fdp (partenerul minor in coalitia de guvernamand, insa liderul fdp westerwelle este noul ministru de externe si vice-cancelar) mult mai pozitiva… gasiti mai jos cateva elemente din discutiile de ieri:

Berlin

CDU

• Of course Ukraine, Moldova and By will be integrated into European structures.
• Is it in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures. (more…)