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un policy brief scris impreuna cu Andrew Wilson publicat astazi la ECFR despre politica europeana de vecinatate: Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

The revolutionary upheaval in the Southern neighbourhood and the failures of reforms in most of the Eastern neighbourhood are begging for a revised EU approach to the neighbourhood policy (ENP). In March the EU presented some ideas on ‘a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity’ with the Southern Mediterranean. Some time in May the EU will present also a full review of the ENP. A central concept of the updated ENP is the idea of ‘more for more’ – the EU should give more political and financial support to those neighbourhood countries that implement more reforms and are more democratic.

‘More for more’ stands for a more meritocratic ENP. It should lay the basis for proper differentiation between neighbours, not based on geographic criteria, but based on their performance. The concept is also supposed to change the way the EU is spending its money. Currently the EU pre-allocates most of its assistance to specific neighbourhood states (almost irrespective of their reform performance) in 7-years budgetary cycles. ‘More for more’ is supposed to make it easier to shift its more EU assistance from one neighbourhood state to another depending on their reform performance. Overall, the concept the concept of ‘more for more’ is laudable and fair, but also quite slippery. (more…)

Just when the southern neighbourhood of the EU is shaken by a wave of revolutionary situations that toppled consolidated dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, the eastern neighbourhood seems to be in the middle of a trend towards authoritarian consolidation. So the paradox is that whereas the Southern neighbours look like those in the East in the revolutionary years of 2003-2005, but in fast forward mode, the Eastern neighbourhood seems to look increasingly like the south a few years ago – a collection of states with increasingly close economic relations with Europe, but with centralised, non-competitive politics, which routinely afford to ignore the EU on many political and security questions. Today, every country in the Eastern neighbourhood except Moldova is less pluralistic than it was 5 years ago (though Belarus arguably could not become worse).

Seen from Ukraine, Moldova or most of the new EU member states one of the most irritating aspects of the European neighbourhood policy is that it dumps together the Southern and the Eastern neighbours of the EU. The Eastern neighbours tend to be rather arrogant about the Mediterannean neighbours of the EU. (more…)

In 2003 -2005 revolutions in the neighbourhood were all the rage. Georgia, Ukraine and Lebanon have all inspired high-hopes among their own populations, as well as the EU and US. Then, many of those hopes collapsed, the revolutions lost their glitz, and the EU and US settled for a revolution-sceptic mood. Having gone through enthusiasm and then fatigue for revolutions, the EU now has to have views on revolutions again. It would rather not. But in less than two months the EU neighbourhood has been agitated by revolutionary situations in Belarus, Albania, Tunisia and now Egypt.

Coming up with coherent EU responses to today’s ‘revolutions’ is more difficult. (more…)

Throughout the 90s in Central and Eastern Europe, and later in the Balkans reformism and democracy tended to go hand in hand. Governments which were more respectful of democratic norms, also tended to be more reformist. (By ‘democracy’ I mean respect for human rights, media freedoms and opposition parties. And by ‘reformism’ I mean the implementation of reforms such as fighting corruption, cutting red tape, improving the business climate, modernising state institutions like police, customs, tax inspectorates  or the border guards.)

In a sense, the 90s was a simpler world in which Meciar, Tudjman or Milosevic were undemocratic and non-reformist; whereas Dzurinda, Mesic, and Djindjic were both reformist and democratic. The good and the bad guys were obvious; the black was clearly distinguishable from the white. And the EU’s approach to these governments was shaped by this unbreakable link between reformism and democracy.

But it seems that the Eastern neighbourhood is different. There is much more grey than black and white. Categorising the likes of Yuschenko, Timoshenko, Saakashvili, Putin and Medvedev is more difficult. (more…)

dupa cum am promis incerc sa recuperez pe blog, inclusiv cu unele impresii de la niste evenimente din ultimele 1-2 luni. in noiembrie am fost la doua evenimente organizate de European Stability Initiative (ESI). ESI sunt inventivi si deseori te provoaca sa iesi din zonele de confort intelectual.

conferinta cu pauze muzicale si artistice (inclusiv un filmulet de pavel braila)… din astea se intampla doar la viena. iata cateva secvente video si informatii suplimentare, tezele lui rainer munz; rory stewart e tipul care a traversat afganistanul pe jos in iarna 2002; si un blog post de Rumeli Observer/Gerald Knaus (da, da e vorba de fortareata din Istanbul) inspirat de aceasta dezbatere.

si cateva elemente din prezentarea mea:

Is Europe really a continent in decline – and what kind of foreign policy can such a continent pursue?

• Broader picture – it is not so much decline, as ‘relative decline’. This is not decline, but rather insufficient growth because others are rising faster. Relative decline is growth, but insufficient growth.

• In the East the EU is more present than ever. Ru, Az and Md have over 50% of their trade with the EU. Crisis-management missions in Georgia and Moldova. DCFTA talks, Association Agreements, visa-facilitation and visa-free talks. More contacts than ever before– visits, ministerials, summits etc. 5 years ago – EU had delegations only in Ge and Ua. Now in all 6 EaP states.

• The EU is more present, but not necessarily more powerful. (more…)

Brainstorm la Bruxelles pe UE-Rusia. 4 ministri de externe UE. iata cateva citate interesante.  Ieri la Bxl a avut loc si reuniunea grupului de prieteni a Ucrainei – 14 state membre reprezentate.

Ukraine

“To Ukraine – don’t think you will get to the EU through geopolitics. Many EU states will be delighted if you are not part of the EU.”

“Ukraine lost herself. There is something Palestinian about it. They never missed a chance to miss a chance. They still don’t understand that you don’t  negotiate with the EU, you simply have to accept the EU acquis. This is very hard and humiliating, but the only way.” (more…)

(with updates)… I have just returned from Germany from a joint ECFR-Bertelsman event on the “Eastern partnership or Partnership with Russia”. Of course, the answer is with both. No need to spend time on this. But I got a certain sense that the German debate on Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood might be changing. Of course this is only a snapshot and such trends are far from consolidated. And they have yet to trickle down through the German foreign policy machinery, not least in the Brussels committees. But here are some of the interesting nuances I have heard in my convesrsations with a few experts as well as FDP and CDU (the new coalition partners) voices.

On Ukraine

There might be an increasing sense that Ukraine, Moldova, and perhaps Belarus will “of course” join the EU. Though with two caveats:  1) in the long run (defined as 20-30 years), and 2) “this should happen at our own pace, not due to geopolitical considerations”. The language is still more positive than I ever heard in Germany. (more…)

o escala scurta la berlin ieri. am prezentat raportul pe politica de vecinatate la un eveniment comun organizat cu bertelsmann. interventii interesante din partea a doi parlamentari germani din CDU si FDP (care spre deosebire de parlamentarii din majoritatea celorlalte state chiar au influenta asupra politicii externe). din cate inteleg are loc o discutie ceva mai larga privind redefinirea accentelor din politica externa germana. discutia inca continua, dar am impresia ca fdp (partenerul minor in coalitia de guvernamand, insa liderul fdp westerwelle este noul ministru de externe si vice-cancelar) mult mai pozitiva… gasiti mai jos cateva elemente din discutiile de ieri:

Berlin

CDU

• Of course Ukraine, Moldova and By will be integrated into European structures.
• Is it in our interests to give Siberia to China? We are interested in a strong Russia integrated into European structures. (more…)

Behind the flow of depressive commentaries related to the appointments of Catherine Ashton and (less so) Herman van Rompuy, there are more EU foreign policy news coming – the announcement of the new Commission’s line-up. One interesting development is the merging of enlargement and neighbourhood portfolios under one Commissioner – Stefan Fule (Czech Republic). A couple of months ago I heard a murmur in Brussels saying that it is way too early to give the enlargement portfolio to a new member state. Apparently, it is not. (I also heard the Czechs would never get a substantial portfolio because of Klaus’ foot-dragging on Lisbon.)

More importantly, I never thought that enlargement-wary EU member states would ever accept the merging of the enlargement and neighbourhood portfolios under one commissioner (though formally, Barroso is in charge of the distribution of portfolios). For many in the EU this would send all the wrong signals to states like Ukraine and Moldova that want to join the EU. (more…)